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ARTICLE
LIFTING THE PALL OF ORTHODOXY:
THE NEED FOR HEARING A MULTITUDE
OF TONGUES IN AND BEYOND THE
SEXUAL EDUCATION CURRICULA AT
PUBLIC HIGH SCHOOLS
Carlo A. Pedriolil
High schools may be the most homophobic institutions in
American society, and woe be to anyone who would challenge
the heterosexist premises on which they operate. 2
I. INTRODUCTION
High school is a difficult time for many young adults, but it
is especially difficult for sexual minorities 3 who struggle with the
1. B.A. (summa cum laude), 1999, Communication and English, California
State University, Stanislaus; J.D., 2002, University of the Pacific; M.A., 2003, Com-
munication, University of Utah. Member, State Bar of California. Currently, the
author is a Ph.D. candidate in Communication at the University of Utah. For
thoughts on and responses to previous versions of this Article, the author gratefully
acknowledges Lawrence C. Levine of the University of the Pacific, Frank Margonis
of the University of Utah, Chad Pedrioli, formerly of the University of California,
Berkeley, and Craig 0. Rich of the University of Utah. The author presented a
previous version of this Article as part of a Communication and Law Interest Group
panel at the 94th annual meeting of the Eastern Communication Association, which
took place in Washington, D.C., in April 2003.
2. Gerald Unks, Thinking about the Gay Teen, in THE GAY TEEN: EDUCA-
TIONAL PRACTICE AND THEORY FOR LESBIAN, GAY, AND BISEXUAL ADOLESCENTS
3, 5 (Gerald Unks ed., 1995).
3. Outside of quotations, this Article adopts the term sexual minorities to refer
to gays, lesbians, bisexuals, transgender individuals, and other people whose sexual
orientations do not fall within the realm of heterosexuality, which is the cultural
norm in the United States and many other countries. Laurie Rose Kepros, Queer
Theory: Weed or Seed in the Garden of Legal Theory?, 9 LAW & SEXUALITY 279,
284 (2000) (noting heterosexuality as culturally normative). The term sexual minori-
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added burden of not fitting into a heteronormative culture. The
case of a fifteen-year-old young man from Jackson, Mississippi
illustrates this point. After seeing Indiana Youth Group (IYG),
an Indianapolis support group for sexual minorities, on ABC's
20/20 program, the young man wrote the following to the group:
If you refuse [to help] me, all I will have left is suicide .... I
am a gay teen. When my friends found out, they all disowned
me. Some even come together to beat me up. I am not afraid
or ashamed to say that I have never hurt or cried as much as I
am doing right now. I am so alone. Even my father will have
nothing to do with me. My mother does not know, and I plan
to keep it like that for as long as I can. Right now she is the
ties describes "all individuals who have traditionally been distinguished by societies
because of... sexual orientation, inclination, behavior, or nonconformity with gen-
der roles or identity." Marilyn Sanchez-Osorio, The Road to Recognition and Appli-
cation of the Fundamental Constitutional Right to Marry of Sexual Minorities in the
United States, the Netherlands, and Hungary: A Comparative Legal Study, 8 ILSA J.
INT'L & COMp. L. 131, 132 (2001). While differences exist within and among the
various groups that one might place under the rubric sexual minorities, individuals in
these groups also have commonalities "on the basis of mistreatment due to the inter-
play of sex, gender and sexual orientation." Francisco Valdes, Beyond Sexual Orien-
tation in Queer Legal Theory: Majoritarianism, Multidimensionality, and
Responsibility in Social Justice Scholarship or Legal Scholars as Cultural Warriors, 75
DENV. U. L. REV. 1409, 1410 n.5 (1998). Such common mistreatment makes seeing
these groups as portions of one larger group reasonable. Id.
Writers have employed other umbrella terms besides sexual minorities to de-
scribe individuals who are outside of the cultural norms of sexual orientation, but
some of these terms have been more problematic. For instance, one such term is
homosexual. Teresa de Lauretis, Queer Theory: Lesbian and Gay Sexualities, 3 DIF-
FERENCES: J. FEMINIST & CULTURAL STUD. iii, v (1991). Although used, this term
carries a stigma with it, in part due to the medical association of the word. Id. at v.
At one time, psychiatry classified homosexuality as a mental disorder. DAVID M.
HALPERIN, SAINT FOUCAULT: TOWARDS A GAY HAGIOGRAPHY 206 n.96 (1995).
Another umbrella term is Queer, which comes from Queer theory. Kepros,
supra, at 281. Adopting the previously pejorative term queer (now often capitalized
as Queer), id., Queer theorists tend to understand the term as referring to that which
is "at odds with the normal, the legitimate, the dominant." HALPERIN, supra, at 62.
The term is about positionality in relation to the normative. Id. Such theorists re-
ject predetermined identities and aim to undermine "existing systems of discourse,
knowledge, and power." Carlos A. Ball, Essentialism and Universalism in Gay
Rights Philosophy: Liberalism Meets Queer Theory, 26 LAW & Soc. INQUIRY 271,
273 (2001). Queer theorists adopt postmodern perspectives because these theorists
assume "social conditions and human understanding of them are complex, contin-
gent and contextual," and, in resisting "universal or unidimensional generalization,"
such theorists instead search "for the shifting details of nuance and particularity."
Valdes, supra, at 1419. Despite the efforts of Queer theorists, some older members
of sexual minority groups find the term Queer offensive because of its historically
pejorative connotation. Kepros, supra, at 281. For another discussion of the term
Queer, see IAN K. MACGILLIVRAY, SEXUAL ORIENTATION AND SCHOOL POLICY: A
PRACTICAL GUIDE FOR TEACHERS, ADMINISTRATORS, AND COMMUNITY ACTIVISTS
10 (2004).
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only person talking to me. You guys are my only hope. I beg
of you to help. 4
Inundated with over one hundred thousand letters and
phone calls after the 20/20 episode, IYG was unable to respond
to even one thousand of the letters and calls.5 Given the content
of the letter from the young man in Mississippi, the low response
rate that IYG could manage, and the fact that suicide is the lead-
ing cause of death among sexual minority youth,6 one must ask
whether the author of the letter survived his high school exper-
iences. Indeed, teenagers like this young man are desperate for
support that they are not receiving from their schools or
elsewhere.
Based on the above letter, the high school that the anony-
mous author attended likely failed to deal adequately with the
issues that sexual minorities face. If the author's school is like
many public7 high schools today, it may have limited teaching
about minority sexualities 8 in one of three ways: (1) by com-
pletely banning the topic of minority sexualities, (2) by banning
the view that minority sexualities are acceptable, or (3) by requir-
ing that teachers emphasize the view that minority sexualities are
unacceptable. 9 Regardless of the ways in which high schools
send it, the message to sexual minorities is the same: Minority
sexualities are socially unacceptable.
When public high schools promote heterosexuality at the
cost of denying sexual minority youth the opportunity to learn
about minority sexualities, these schools contribute to the disas-
trous situation in which many sexual minority high school stu-
4. Chris Bull, Suicidal Tendencies: Is Anguish over Sexual Orientation Causing
Gay and Lesbian Teens to Kill Themselves?, ADVOCATE, Apr. 5, 1994, at 34, 42.
5. Id.
6. Kelli Kristine Armstrong, Note, The Silent Minority Within a Minority: Fo-
cusing on the Needs of Gay Youth in Our Public Schools, 24 GOLDEN GATE U. L.
REV. 67, 75 (1994).
7. This Article will focus on public rather than private high schools because the
U.S. Constitution generally limits governmental rather than private action. WIL-
LIAM COHEN & JONATHAN D. VARAT, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: CASES AND MATERI-
ALS 1107 (10th ed. 1998). As the Article will argue, at stake in this case are
individual rights like free speech and substantive due process liberty.
8. This Article adopts the term minority sexualities to stress the point that sex-
ual minority youth can have a variety of sexualities, including gay, lesbian, bisexual,
transgender, and other sexualities. See supra note 3.
9. Nancy Tenney, Note, The Constitutional Imperative of Reality in Public
School Curricula: Untruths about Homosexuality as a Violation of the First Amend-
ment, 60 BROOK. L. REV. 1599, 1604 (1995).
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dents find themselves. 10 This approach, which many public high
schools take, is unnecessarily destructive and warrants prompt
change. Instead of helping to perpetuate many of the challenges
that sexual minority students face in high school, public high
schools can and need to help address these challenges.
To establish the case for such a position, this Article will be-
gin by presenting the plight of many sexual minority high school
students. Next, the Article will offer suggestions on how public
high schools can help sexual minority students deal with their
sexualities, namely by: forming support groups for sexual minor-
ity youth, discussing a wide variety of sexual orientation perspec-
tives when appropriate in classes, instituting diversity training for
teachers, and implementing non-discrimination policies that ad-
dress sexual orientation. In addition, this Article will demon-
strate that the proposed approaches are constitutional under the
First Amendment because they do not violate speech rights of
public high schools or of students enrolled in such high schools.
Finally, this Article will demonstrate that the proposed ap-
proaches are also constitutional under the Fourteenth Amend-
ment because they do not violate the substantive due process
liberty rights of the parents of public high school students, re-
gardless of the sexual orientations of the students.
II. THE SPECIAL CHALLENGES OF SEXUAL MINORITY
HIGH SCHOOL STUDENTS
In addition to facing the normal challenges that high school
students face, sexual minority students face various additional
other challenges. For instance, sexual minority students must
deal with the harsh reality of being outsiders in a heteronorma-
tive culture. This difficulty manifests itself in such cases as high
school proms, dating more generally, and advertising aimed at
teens. These phenomena all involve the promotion of young
men and young women together as the cultural sexual ideal. Sex-
ual minority students soon learn that their sexualities are not ac-
ceptable. To describe this phenomenon of the forced and
10. Public high schools are by no means the sole cause of the challenges that
sexual minority high school students face. For example, non-accepting family mem-
bers and heteronormative advertisers, among others, are complicit, too. However,
as this Article will argue, public high schools can help remedy not only the problems
that public high schools themselves create, but also some of the problems that other
parties create.
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expected heterosexual climate, one author has used the term
compulsory heterosexuality."
Moreover, not only do sexual minority youth suffer from be-
ing unable to fit into a heteronormative environment, but they
also become direct victims of this environment. For instance,
peers at school name-call, ostracize, and sometimes even physi-
cally abuse sexual minority youth.' 2 Sexual minority youth who
have not come out may suffer from the ongoing stresses of hiding
their sexualities and fearing discovery. 13 Depression, anxiety,
fear, and low self-esteem can follow such victimization.14
In addition to not fitting into a heterosexual environment
and to being victims of that environment, sexual minority youth
suffer from sexual heath problems. Sexually transmitted diseases
are the second most commonly diagnosed infectious diseases in
adolescents in general, but the risk of infection for sexual minor-
ity youth is even higher than it is for heterosexual youth.' 5 In
part, the reason for the increased risk of infection in sexual mi-
nority youth is the lack of supportive environments for open so-
cialization, and this lack of support often leads to anonymous
sexual encounters and other high-risk behaviors.' 6 Young gay in-
dividuals suffer even more as they are in the highest risk group
for exposure to HIV.17
Furthermore, difficulties arise when sexual minority youth
face the issue of discussing their sexualities with their parents.
Sexual minority youth fail to fit into the U.S. culture's Hetero-
sexual Family Myth,18 which is a plan for what individuals alleg-
11. ADRIENNE RICH, BLOOD, BREAD, AND POETRY'23 (1986). In using the
term compulsory heterosexuality, Rich refers to the environment in which lesbians,
particularly lesbians in scholarly circles, find themselves. Id. However, the term
might just as well describe the experiences of multiple sexual minority groups, not
just lesbians, both inside and outside of academic circles because the term effectively
captures the general sexual culture in the United States.
12. CAITLIN RYAN & DONNA FUTITERMAN, LESBIAN & GAY YOUTH: CARE &
COUNSELING 23 (1998).
13. Id. at 21.
14. Id. at 24.
15. Id. at 39.
16. Id.
17. Id. at 105 (also noting that young females are at increased risk for con-
tracting HIV).
18. GILBERT HERDT & BRUCE KOFF, SOMETHING TO TELL You: THE ROAD
FAMILIES TRAVEL WHEN A CHILD IS GAY 16 (2002). Of importance is the point
that the heterosexual family can be beneficial for many people. However, problems
arise when society imposes this model on individuals who do not fit within the
model.
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edly should strive to achieve in society.19 This social ideal
includes heterosexual parents and heterosexual children. Under
this paradigm, when sexual minority youth fail to meet social ex-
pectations of heterosexual children in a heterosexual family,
mainstream society labels such youth as "abnormal" or
"flawed." °20 Some sexual minority youth no doubt internalize
their "shortcomings" and let that internalization erode away at
them from the inside. Other sexual minority youth may reveal
their sexual orientations to their parents but suffer from condi-
tional parental love, by which parents love their children only so
long as those children contribute to the ideal of the heterosexual
family.21 In other words, to receive love from their parents, the
teenagers need to be heterosexual.
Additionally, in response to the coming out of a child, par-
ents may go through a variety of reactions that are harmful to the
now-out youth. Such reactions include denial of the child's sex-
ual orientation, 22 anger at realizing that the status quo has
changed with the child's coming out,2 3 bargaining with the child
that if the child renounces coming out the parents will pretend
that the coming out never happened, 24 and parental depression.2 5
The effects of these reactions on the sexual minority youth can
be crushing because the parents are providing no support when
their child most needs that support.
Often forced away from home by this type of parental intol-
erance, many sexual minority youth end up on the street.2 6 In
fact, twenty-six in out of one hundred sexual minority teenagers
are forced to leave their homes after revealing their sexual orien-
tations. 27 Sexual minority street youth comprise a disproportion-
ately high percentage of street youth in general, perhaps one in
four.2 8 In some large metropolitan areas, the percentages may be
higher. For example, in Los Angeles, sexual minority youth
19. Id. at 15.
20. Id. at 16.
21. Id. at 17.
22. RITCH C. SAVIN-WILLIAMS, MOM, DAD. I'M GAY: How FAMILIES NEGOTI-
ATE COMING OUT 37 (2001).
23. Id. at 39 (noting that types of anger vary from agitation to dismay to rage).
24. Id. at 41.
25. Id. at 42.
26. Ruthann Robson, Our Children: Kids of Queer Parents & Kids Who Are
Queer: Looking at Sexual Minority Rights from a Different Perspective, 64 ALB. L.
REV. 915, 933-34 (2001).
27. Armstrong, supra note 6, at 76.
28. RYAN & FUTTERMAN, supra note 12, at 25.
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make up about twenty-five to thirty-five percent of street
youth.2 9 In Seattle, sexual minority youth make up approxi-
mately forty percent of street youth.30 Unfortunately, many of
these sexual minority youth on the streets turn to prostitution
and drugs.31
The results of not fitting into a heterosexual school environ-
ment, the negative responses from peers, sexual health problems,
parental rejection, and street life can be deadly. Not surprisingly,
suicide is the leading cause of death among sexual minority
youth.32 Between six and thirteen in out of one hundred adoles-
cents in general have attempted to commit suicide,33 but between
twenty and forty in out of one hundred sexual minority adoles-
cents have attempted to commit suicide.34 The suicide attempt
rates for sexual minority youth who are homeless, runaways, or
victims of violence may be even higher.35 Thus, almost one in
three sexual minority youths has attempted suicide, while sexual
minority youth are about three times more likely than heterosex-
ual youth to try to commit suicide. Although adolescents in gen-
eral have many challenges to address, sexual minority youth have
those challenges plus the added weight of their sexual
orientations.
As grave as the suffering of sexual minority youth may be,
society as a whole also suffers costs associated with the chal-
lenges of young sexual minorities. For instance, legitimizing
prejudice against sexual minority students undesirably legitimizes
prejudice and discrimination against other minority students and
minorities in general.36 This legitimization of discrimination
against sexual minority students offers all students a "poor les-
son[ ] in citizenship. '' 37 Moreover, sexual minority youth who fail
to become socially productive due to their many challenges al-
most inevitably will need public assistance, and ultimately tax-




32. Armstrong, supra note 6, at 75.
33. RYAN & FurrmAN, supra note 12, at 56.
34. Id. at 60.
35. Id.
36. Donna I. Dennis & Ruth E. Harlow, Gay Youth and the Right to Education,
4 YALE L. & POL'Y REV. 446, 475 (1986).
37. Id. at 476.
38. Id. at 475-76.
215
UCLA WOMEN'S LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 13:209
parents may expel an out lesbian child from their home and in
effect force her to live on the streets. Such ensuing homelessness
becomes a societal problem. Because the well-being of sexual
minority students can help minimize these social costs, economic
and otherwise, society has a financial and ethical stake in the
well-being of sexual minority youth.
III. SOME APPROACHES TO THE SPECIAL CHALLENGES OF
SEXUAL MINORITY HIGH SCHOOL STUDENTS
With the possible exception of the matter of parental rejec-
tion, public schools can implement several approaches to the
aforementioned challenges that sexual minority high school stu-
dents often suffer. These proposed approaches involve both dia-
logue39 on and argumentation 40 about sexual minority issues.
Specifically, this part of the Article will address formation of sup-
port groups, discussion of a wide variety of sexual orientation
perspectives when appropriate in classes, diversity training for
teachers, and non-discrimination policies that address sexual
orientation.
To begin with, schools can offer support groups for sexual
minority youth in which youth can discuss issues of concern, in-
cluding sexuality, sexual minority social life, and suicide.41 Spe-
39. The term dialogue can refer to "talk ... that affirms the person-to-person
relationship between discussants and which acknowledges their collective right and
intellectual capacity to make sense of the world." NANCY M. DIXON, PERSPECTIVES
ON DIALOGUE: MAKING TALK DEVELOPMENTAL FOR INDIVIDUALS AND ORGANI-
ZATIONS 24 (1996). Dixon adds that dialogue affirms the positions of discussants but
that it can lead to the examination of one's own positions and the positions of
others. Id. at 24-25. Although dialogue can lead to examination of discussants' posi-
tions, it is not judgmental. Id. at 28.
40. The term argumentation tends to refer to "the discursive techniques al-
lowing [people] to induce or to increase the mind's adherence to the theses presented
for its assent." CH. PERELMAN & L. OLBRECHTS-TYTECA, THE NEW RHETORIC: A
TREATISE ON ARGUMENTATION 4 (John Wilkinson & Purcell Weaver trans., Univ.
Notre Dame Press 1969) (1958). Another definition suggests that the term argumen-
tation can refer to "reason giving in communication situations by people whose pur-
pose is the justification of acts, beliefs, attitudes, and values." AUSTIN J. FREELEY &
DAVID L. STEINBERG, ARGUMENTATION AND DEBATE: CRITICAL THINKING FOR
REASONED DECISION MAKING 3 (10th ed. 2000). As these definitions would sug-
gest, some risk is inherent in argumentation over sexual minority issues.
41. Armstrong, supra note 6, at 89. It would be hard for schools to keep confi-
dential the identities of students who attended such support groups because talk can
spread quickly on high school campuses. Hence, if a campus were somewhat intoler-
ant of sexual minorities, a degree of risk would be present for sexual minorities who
chose to attend such groups. Schools still would need to offer, but not require, such
groups since the alternative could be not providing sexual minorities with a venue
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cial speakers can come to talk with sexual minority youth about
such pressing issues.42 A model example of a support group for
sexual minority youth is Project 10, which Los Angeles counselor
and science teacher Virginia Uribe founded at Fairfax High
School in 1984.43 The program's goal is "to keep students in
school, off drugs, and sexually responsible. ' 44 Project 10 has re-
ceived widespread attention and even led to an East Coast coun-
terpart, Project 10 East in Cambridge, Massachusetts. 45
Although support groups can help sexual minority teenag-
ers, such groups alone cannot fully address the exigencies of the
situation. Indeed, heterosexual youth and teachers can benefit
from exposure to sexual minority perspectives because a broad
education can help "all students by providing more accurate pic-
tures of the world and of the cultures that make up that world. ' 46
Thus, in addition to heterosexual perspectives, sexual minority
perspectives also call for discussion in appropriate classroom
contexts. For instance, sexual minority issues should arise natu-
rally in sexual education classes, but such issues also may come
up in literature and history classes as subject matter warrants.
An important character in a play or a key individual in a histori-
cal period may be gay. Given time and an environment of toler-
ance, discourse can help to build a broader understanding about
human sexuality in its many forms.47
for discussing issues of concern. Each sexual minority student would have to deter-
mine the potential risk of attending a support group and whether the benefits of
attendance would outweigh the potential harms that might come from intolerant
peers on campus.
42. Id. at 90.
43. Id. at 85.
44. DONOVAN R. WALLING, GAY TEENS AT RISK 25 (1993).
45. Armstrong, supra note 6, at 87. Although Uribe received various accolades
for her efforts, Project 10 also received negative attention from parties who believed
that taxpayers' money should not go to counseling sexual minority youth. Regard-
less, over half of the student body at Fairfax High School viewed the program posi-
tively. Id.
46. MICHELE S. MOSES, EMBRACING RACE: WHY WE NEED RACE-CONSCIOUS
EDUCATION POLICY 86 (2002) (specifically addressing multicultural education and
its merits).
47. As with support groups, a degree of risk is inherent in class discussion on
minority sexualities. Immaturity can cloud students' thinking, and sexual minority
youth may be at verbal risk. In the interest of education, this risk may be necessary,
but a seasoned teacher can establish an appropriate atmosphere for class discussion
and hold students to such a standard. The ensuing discussion may be one in which
students have the chance to think carefully about issues that they had never consid-
ered at length before.
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Furthermore, in many cases professional development
through diversity training for teachers may be necessary.48 High
school teachers can learn to become more knowledgeable re-
garding diversity of sexual orientations as a part of diversity
overall, which includes diversity of race, culture, gender, religion,
disabilities, and the like. Such training can involve presentations,
discussions, and readings that allow teachers to deal more effec-
tively with attacks on sexual minorities.49 This new awareness of
diversity would manifest itself in more inclusive curricula, which,
as appropriate, would deal with sexual minority issues in class
lessons and reading assignments.50 Of particular note, the sexual
education class in the curriculum needs to include a component
on minority sexualities, as such a class already focuses on hetero-
sexuality. Also, teachers should become more aware of making
sure that school libraries include materials on sexual minority is-
sues so that sexual minority and heterosexual students have ac-
cess to those materials and can learn from them.51
Finally, schools need non-discrimination policies that pro-
hibit discrimination based on sexual orientation.5 2 Such policies
should ban discrimination based on sexual orientation much as
they already ban discrimination based on race, culture, gender,
religion, disability, and the like. In implementing these non-dis-
crimination policies, schools need to adhere to the policies in all
respects, beginning when school districts hire new employees
who may well be sexual minorities.5 3 Drafting non-discrimina-
tion policies should not be too laborious since various legal
groups already offer model policies. 54
48. Armstrong, supra note 6, at 91; WALLING, supra note 44, at 22.
49. Armstrong, supra note 6, at 91-92.
50. WALLING, supra note 44, at 21.
51. Id. at 23.
52. Id. at 21.
53. Id.
54. See, e.g., American Civil Liberties Union, Model Anti-Harassment and Dis-
crimination Policies for Schools, ACLU ONLINE (Oct. 23, 2001), at http://www.aclu.
org/LesbianGayRights/LesbianGayRights.cfm?ID=9214&c=106 (last visited Jan. 31,
2005) (on file with UCLA Women's Law Journal). The ACLU's model discrimina-
tion policy states:
The School District is committed to equal opportu-
nity for all students and all staff.
It is District policy that no one shall be treated differently, separately,
or have any action directly affecting him or her taken on the basis of
race, religion, national origin, marital status, sex, sexual orientation,
gender identity, or disability where a person is otherwise qualified or
could be with reasonable accommodation.
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Eventually, these proposed policies should lead to positive
results. For instance, a sexual minority student body population
that has a voice in matters related to sexual orientation will be
less marginalized and thus healthier. Also, both sexual minority
individuals and heterosexual individuals at school should gain
from their studies a greater understanding of diversity that exists
within a democratic society.55 In due time, students ought to be
able, at a minimum, to tolerate individuals of other sexual orien-
tations. Pragmatically, many heterosexuals may have sexual mi-
nority siblings, friends, or colleagues,5 6 and many sexual
minorities may have heterosexual siblings, friends, or colleagues.
IV. CONSTITUTIONAL QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS
In light of the rights of schools and students to free speech
and of parents to raising their children, several constitutional
concerns over the proposed policies may arise. This part of the
Article lays out current law on speech in schools as well as cur-
The immediate remedy for any act of discrimination shall be to end it,
treat the individual equally, and, as much as practically possible, to
eradicate any effects of discrimination. Discipline should be imposed
where appropriate.
Id.
Furthermore, the ACLU has provided a model policy that addresses harass-
ment. Id. Assumedly, harassment is a specific type of discrimination. This second
model policy, in relevant portion, fleshes out how students can be victims of
harassment:
Harassment of a student by another student or by a teacher or other
staff member is a violation of school policy. This includes (but is not
limited to) harassment based on race, national origin, marital status,
sex, sexual orientation, gender identity, religion, or disability. Punish-
able harassment is conduct, including verbal conduct, (1) that creates
(or will certainly create) a hostile environment by substantially inter-
fering with a student's educational benefits, opportunities, or perform-
ance, or with a student's physical or psychological well-being; or (2)
that is threatening or seriously intimidating.
To prevent harassment in the first instance, staff members should
teach - teach why harassment is wrong and teach that tolerance and
respect are essential to a free society. In response to an act of harass-
ment, staff members should intervene immediately to stop the harass-
ment and, if appropriate, should punish the harassment promptly,
consistently, and proportionately to the seriousness of the act. But the
response should not end there; rather, staff members should deter fu-
ture harassment with continuing lessons of tolerance and respect.
Id.
55. MOSES, supra note 46, at 86 (discussing multicultural education and its
merits).
56. Armstrong, supra note 6, at 96 (commenting on siblings and friends only).
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rent law on the rights of parents to raise children and will address
potential constitutional concerns.
A. Speech Rights of Schools and Students
1. The Law on Speech Rights of Schools and Students
In providing the rules for regulating speech in the public
school setting, the U.S. Supreme Court has offered a pair of tests
under the Free Speech Clause of the First Amendment. 57 First,
under the Tinker test, when attempting to regulate speech that
happens to occur on a school campus, the school must show that
the speech leads to a material and substantial interference with
the school's appropriate discipline. 58 Moreover, a hypothetical
threat of interference is insufficient to allow the school to restrict
speech. 59
Second, under the Hazelwood test, when speech could be
construed as school-sponsored, the school may restrict the
speech by demonstrating that the speech restrictions "are reason-
ably related to legitimate pedagogical concerns. '60 This test ap-
plies in situations such as "school-sponsored publications,
theatrical productions, and other expressive activities that stu-
dents, parents, and members of the community might reasonably
perceive to bear the imprimatur of the school. '61 For the restric-
tion to violate the First Amendment, there must be "no valid ed-
ucational purpose" to the restriction.62 The Hazelwood test is an
easier standard for the school to meet than the Tinker test and
permits a greater degree of restriction on speech.
In addition to meeting the Tinker and Hazelwood tests, pub-
lic schools, as agents of the government, may not discriminate
against a particular viewpoint.63 Viewpoint discrimination occurs
57. The second of these tests also arose under the Free Press Clause of the First
Amendment. See Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260 (1988).
58. Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 509 (1969) (re-
strictions on students' wearing black armbands to protest the war in Vietnam a First
Amendment violation). Tinker involved the speech of junior high and high school
students. Id. at 504.
59. Id. at 508.
60. Hazelwood Sch. Dist., 484 U.S. at 273 (censoring of portions of high school
newspaper which discussed pregnant students and quality of parenting not a First
Amendment violation because privacy rights of pregnant students potentially
harmed and parental rebuttal opportunity not provided).
61. Id. at 271.
62. Id. at 273.
63. Tinker, 393 U.S. at 509. Arguing that complete viewpoint neutrality exists
would be difficult. While schools are not supposed to pick and choose among view-
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when "the government targets . . .particular views taken by
speakers on a subject." 64 An example of viewpoint discrimina-
tion would be a school's granting access to its bulletin boards to
certain outside political groups but not to other outside political
groups.65 The general legal prohibition against viewpoint dis-
crimination pertains to public fora, such as public parks, and non-
public fora, such as public schools,66 as well as to designated
public fora like meeting spaces that the government has opened
for public discussion.67 A public forum is public property where
people traditionally have gathered to express ideas and exchange
views, 68 while a nonpublic forum is public property not tradition-
ally considered an arena for public communication. 69 A desig-
nated public forum is a nonpublic forum that the government has
made available for public discussion.70
In the school context, viewpoint discrimination can be par-
ticularly harmful for several reasons. For instance, viewpoint dis-
crimination limits students' opportunities to discuss controversial
issues. Discussing controversial issues helps to stimulate new
ideas in the minds of students and also assists students in devel-
oping critical inquiry skills.71 Moreover, viewpoint discrimina-
tion in education allows the state to mold students into citizens
who serve the needs of the dominant powers within the state,
points on various matters, schools cannot be value-neutral. MACGILLIVRAY, supra
note 3, at 147-48. Indeed, the choice of a curriculum reflects values. Perhaps the
best negotiation of this tension between the rule of viewpoint neutrality and the idea
that any education comes from one perspective or another is that schools in a demo-
cratic society should base their curricula on democratic values. Id. at 148. For in-
stance, schools should allow all students to have a voice. Id. at 147-48. At the same
time, schools should respect students' individuality and not force students to adopt
particular perspectives.
64. Rosenberger v. Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 829 (1995).
65. Richard J. Peltz, Censorship Tsunami Spares College Media: To Protect Free
Expression on Public Campuses, Lessons from the "College Hazelwood" Case, 68
TENN. L. REV. 481, 507 (2001) (not mentioning the political aspect of hypothetical
outside groups).
66. Gail Paulus Sorenson, The "Public Forum Doctrine" and Its Application in
School and College Cases, 20 J.L. & EDUC. 445, 458 (1991)
67. Leslie Gielow Jacobs, The Public Sensibilities Forum, 95 Nw. U. L. REV.
1357, 1370 (2001).
68. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1243-44 (7th ed. 1999).
69. Id. at 1080.
70. Id. at 1244.
71. Marjorie Heins, Viewpoint Discrimination, 24 HAS-lNGS CONST. L.Q. 99,
169 (1996); Tenney, supra note 9, at 1636-37.
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which leads to "a despotism over the mind."'72 Because schools
are in part supposed to prepare students to participate in a dem-
ocratic society,73 this phenomenon of governmental mind control
interferes with the democratic process by failing to allow students
to develop the ability of making reasonably autonomous choices
for themselves.
On a related note, students have a right not to be forced to
hold a particular belief. The U.S. Supreme Court has stated that
students cannot "be confined to the expression of those senti-
ments that are officially approved" 74 and that the First Amend-
ment prohibits "laws that cast a pall of orthodoxy over the
classroom. ' 75 Public schools are not "enclaves of totalitarian-
ism."'76 Indeed, schools are to respect the fundamental rights of
students, including free speech rights.77
Furthermore, the U.S. Supreme Court has spoken out in
favor of "wide exposure to that robust exchange of ideas which
discovers truth 'out of a multitude of tongues, [rather] than
through any kind of authoritative selection." 78 The Supreme
72. Stephen Arons & Charles Lawrence III, The Manipulation of Conscious-
ness: A First Amendment Critique of Schooling, 15 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 309,
316 n.22 (1980) (quoting JOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY 190-91 (1859)).
73. Id. at 316. The task of preparing students to function well in a democratic
society is not an easy one for schools to accomplish. On one hand, schools need to
instruct students in the principles of a democratic society, while on the other hand
schools have to teach students how to question those principles. Stanley Ingber,
Socialization, Indoctrination, or The "Pall of Orthodoxy": Value Training in the Pub-
lic Schools, 1987 U. ILL. L. REV. 15, 94 (1987). This delicate balancing act recog-
nizes both the collectivistic and individualistic impulses within U.S. society. Id. at
94-95.
74. Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 511 (1969).
75. Keyishian v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of N.Y., 385 U.S. 589, 603 (1967) (aca-
demic freedom case involving loyalty oath for university faculty members). The
Court here noted the importance of exposing students, the future leaders of the
country, to the diverse ideas that teachers often present in class. Id. One way of
thinking about the Court's term pall of orthodoxy is that a pall is a shroud or cover
and orthodoxy is the approved way of thinking or doing. RANDOM HOUSE WEB-
STER'S COLLEGE DICTIONARY 974, 955 (1991).
76. Tinker, 393 U.S. at 511.
77. Id.
78. Keyishian, 385 U.S. at 603 (quoting United States v. Associated Press, 52 F.
Supp. 362, 372 (1943)). Some contemporary understandings of truth are much more
fluid than the traditional modernistic U.S. legal understanding of the concept, under
which legal participants and others can discover an objective truth. See, e.g., BAILEY
KUKLIN & JEFFREY W. STEMPEL, FOUNDATIONS OF THE LAW: AN INTERDISCIPLI-
NARY AND JURISPRUDENTIAL PRIMER 183-84 (1994) (viewing truth as a social con-
struction); Dennis Patterson, From Postmodernism to Law and Truth, 26 HARV. J.L.
& PuB. POL'Y 49, 61-64 (2003) (discussing truth as a linguistic creation).
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Court has applied this perspective on speech to students.79 In
observing the Court's perspective on the speech rights of stu-
dents, two commentators have noted the following: "The more
the government regulates formation of beliefs so as to interfere
with personal consciousness, the fewer people can conceive dis-
senting ideas or perceive contradictions between self-interest and
government-sustained ideological orthodoxy. °80 In short, by also
focusing on the rights of students not to be forced to hold partic-
ular beliefs and instead to have exposure to a wide range of
ideas, the Court has placed limits on the speech rights of public
schools.
2. The Law on Speech Rights of Schools and Students
Applied to Sexual Education
This Article's proposals look more like school-sponsored
speech than speech that simply occurs on campus. For example,
this Article proposes that schools would hold support groups for
sexual minority youth, the school district would provide diversity
training for teachers, and the libraries would contain materials on
sexual minority issues. Because the proposals would trigger the
Hazelwood standard, the school district would need to show that
its limits on speech were "reasonably related to legitimate peda-
gogical concerns. 81
Perhaps the school's best argument against adopting these
proposals is that the school does not wish to be forced to pro-
mote minority sexualities and that by offering education on sex-
ual minority issues to students of different sexual orientations,
the school is being forced to express views that favor minority
sexualities.8 2 Under this reasoning, the allegedly legitimate ped-
79. W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 642 (1943) (flag-salute
case in which the Court held that a school could not force a child to salute the flag).
80. Arons & Lawrence, supra note 72, at 312.
81. Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 273 (1988).
82. See, e.g., Memorandum from Steven C. Baldwin, Member of the California
Assembly, to California Assembly Members 7-8 (May 29, 1997). Baldwin's docu-
ment came in reply to the Memorandum from Sheila James Kuehl, Member of the
California Assembly, to California Assembly (May 20, 1997). During the 1997-98
term, Baldwin and Kuehl clashed over Assembly Bill 101, which proposed to expand
existing non-discrimination statutes applicable to public educational institutions to
include sexual orientation. On June 3, 1997, the Assembly refused passage of the
bill by a vote of thirty-six to forty. LEGIS. COUNSEL, COMPLETE BILL HISTORY FOR
ASSEMBLY. B. 101, 1997-98 Legislative Session, available at http://www.leginfo.ca.
gov/pub/97-98/bill/asm/ab_0101-0150/ab_101_bill_19970604_history.html (last visited
Jan. 31, 2005) (on file with UCLA Women's Law Journal). As of winter 2005, As-
sembly Bill 101 had been inactive since June 4, 1997. Id.
20051
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agogical concern would be the fear of promoting sexual minority
views, and not offering such views would be reasonably related
to addressing that concern.
Several problems exist with this position. To begin with, of-
fering information on sexual minority issues through sexual edu-
cation classes is not the equivalent of adopting a position that
favors sexual minority perspectives on such issues. Rather, the
school is only offering additional perspectives on issues relevant
to students and teachers. The practice is essentially no different
from the school's offering heterosexual perspectives on sexuality,
except that under the proposals this Article makes, the school
would be broadening the discussion of the subject matter in or-
der to be more equitable. Such an approach gives a voice to a
variety of perspectives rather than merely to the perspectives
that are firmly entrenched in a heteronormative society. By way
of an analogy, if public schools choose to teach about religion,
constitutionally they cannot adopt one particular religious per-
spective. Along the same lines, if public schools choose to teach
about human sexuality, constitutionally they cannot endorse one
particular perspective on sexual orientation.83
In the same vein, the fear of allegedly presenting perspec-
tives in favor of sexual minorities is not a legitimate pedagogical
concern. Material that contains minority sexualities is not any
more in favor of sexual minorities than material that contains
heterosexuality is in favor of heterosexual individuals. Students
receive exposure to additional perspectives in the realm of sexu-
ality, which is an area of great interest and relevance to high
school students. Over time, reading about the life experiences of
sexual minorities in literature or history should have a compara-
ble impact to reading about the experiences of heterosexuals, ex-
cept that initially many students may be less informed about the
material on sexual minorities. An end goal is to make students
more knowledgeable of and respectful toward a wide variety of
human beings, even if students choose to disagree with the per-
spectives that others hold.84 Thus, since the school does not have
a legitimate pedagogical concern, it is immaterial whether the
means taken to address that proffered concern are reasonably
related to the concern.
83. MACGILLIVRAY supra note 3, at 160-61.
84. MOSES, supra note 46, at 86, 91 (addressing multicultural education and its
merits).
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Additionally, as agents of the government, public schools
are not allowed to engage in viewpoint discrimination. 85 Thus,
schools may not choose to promote heterosexual perspectives
and suppress sexual minority perspectives because such action
amounts to discrimination based on viewpoint and is constitu-
tionally impermissible.8 6 If public schools opt to teach sexual ed-
ucation, they have a constitutional obligation to offer a variety of
perspectives, including those of sexual minorities, on the topic.
Beyond the constitutional violation, several harms result
from this type of viewpoint discrimination by public high schools.
As noted earlier, part of the purpose of education is to open stu-
dents' minds to different ideas and to facilitate the process of
critical inquiry; exposure to controversy helps to achieve these
ends.87 Ignoring sexual minority perspectives hampers the edu-
cational purposes of teaching open-mindedness and critical in-
quiry. Consequently, since a broad education that encompasses
a variety of perspectives can help students from all backgrounds
learn to think critically,8 8 the lack of such an education for heter-
osexual and sexual minority students provides a far less enriching
experience. All students lose out on an important dimension of
their education.
Another harm that comes from viewpoint discrimination
against sexual minority perspectives is that sexual minority stu-
dents do not have the opportunity to become as empowered
through their high school studies as they might otherwise be-
come. When public high schools present only the ideas that sup-
port and legitimize a heteronormative culture, such as in sexual
education classes and in other classes like English and history,
sexual minority students may never learn about the hetero-
normative hegemony that frequently marginalizes them or how
to overcome that oppression. 89 This result does nothing to rem-
edy many of the problems, especially suicide, that sexual minor-
85. Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 509 (1969).
86. It is important to note that the converse is also impermissible. Schools are
not allowed to promote sexual minority viewpoints and stifle heterosexual
viewpoints.
87. Heins, supra note 71, at 169; Tenney, supra note 9, at 1636-37.
88. MosEs, supra note 46, at 86.
89. Arons & Lawrence, supra note 72, at 322-23. The notion of heteronorma-
tive hegemony addresses power and its use. MACGILLIVRAY, supra note 3, at 112-
13. When heteronormativity "becomes the official position" in education, the edu-
cational power structure perpetuates normalizing discourse that reinforces such a
position and also excludes "other ways of being." Id. at 113. Teachers and students
pick up on this normalizing discourse, and many teachers, assuming that all of their
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ity students face. The current educational system may silence the
voices of sexual minority youth before those voices even have an
opportunity to speak. Under this result, democracy clearly fails
to live up to its potential.
In response to the argument that many public high schools
engage in viewpoint discrimination against sexual minority per-
spectives, one might claim that, in adopting a broader perspective
on sexual education, public high schools will be violating the
speech rights of students opposed to minority sexualities. How-
ever, schools will not be banning the views of students opposed
to minority sexualities. Students still can meet in groups after
school to express their positions. Also, as positions against mi-
nority sexualities arise in the classroom, students can consider in
an appropriate way those positions as existing social or personal
views. For example, the teacher in a literature class may discuss
a particular lesbian protagonist in a novel and then point out that
not everyone accepts the protagonist's sexuality. Discussion may
ensue. Similarly, in a sexual education class the teacher may ad-
dress attraction among sexual minorities along with addressing
attraction among heterosexual individuals; the teacher then can
point out that some people find certain types of sexual attraction
unacceptable. Again, discussion may ensue.90 Regardless, stu-
dents are entitled to adopt or reject such views as the students so
choose. Hence, schools would not cast a new "pall of a ortho-
doxy" over the classroom.
Another argument that one might make against the adop-
tion of a broader perspective of sexual education by public high
schools is that when the state adopts the perspective of tolerance
as opposed to intolerance in its sexual education programs, the
state is engaging in impermissible viewpoint discrimination. 91 To
the contrary, precedent exists for the state's adopting policies of
tolerance over policies of intolerance without the presence of im-
permissible viewpoint discrimination. For example, Title VII of
the 1964 Civil Rights Act adopts the position that discrimination
in employment based on race, color, sex, religion, or national oni-
students are heterosexual, fail to present other possibilities regarding sexual orienta-
tion. Id. Accordingly, the power structure perpetuates heteronormativity. Id.
90. School administrators might even want to host public debates on these is-
sues by inviting speakers to speak for and against minority sexualities. However,
school administrators also may want to consider the potential for heated and poten-
tially damaging rhetoric that might occur in this context.
91. Likely, not too many groups would want to make themselves known for
outright advocacy of intolerance, but some groups may want to do so.
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gin is unacceptable. 92 Also, the California Fair Employment and
Housing Act (CFEHA) adopts the position that employment dis-
crimination based on "race, religious creed, color, national ori-
gin, ancestry, physical disability, mental disability, medical
condition, marital status, sex, age, or sexual orientation" is unac-
ceptable.93 Both Title VII and CFEHA mandate that the gov-
ernment adopt tolerance over intolerance, and the U.S. Supreme
Court has not found either statute to qualify as impermissible
viewpoint discrimination.94 A rationale for this governmental
stance against intolerance is that in many arenas, including em-
ployment and education, the government needs to prevent dis-
crimination against members of outsider groups because equality
is such an important component of a democratic society.95 Thus,
based on Title VII, CFEHA, and similar statutes, public schools
legally need to adopt policies of tolerance over intolerance in
their curricula and provide for diversity in their sexual education
programs.
Related to the rule against viewpoint discrimination are the
U.S. Supreme Court's rules that students cannot be confined to
the expression of officially approved sentiments96 and that the
First Amendment bans "laws that cast a pall of orthodoxy over
the classroom. ' 97 A school district's adoption of a heterosexual
perspective confines students to officially approved sentiments
and casts a pall of orthodoxy over the classroom since adoption
of that view ignores the views of sexual minorities and forces the
school's view on the students. Such action is impermissible
under the First Amendment.
Of importance is the point that in avoiding the pall of ortho-
doxy, schools cannot possibly cover all views on all subjects be-
cause time at school is limited. Accordingly, schools should
cover views on topics likely to impact students' lives.98 Naturally,
both heterosexual and sexual minority students will want infor-
92. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (1972 & Supp. 2004).
93. CAL. Gov'T CODE § 12940(a) (West Supp. 2004).
94. Enforced anti-discrimination legislation like Title VII has existed since the
1960s. The Supreme Court has had ample time to hear a case and find that Title VII
leads to impermissible viewpoint discrimination but to date has not done so.
95. MACGILLIVRAY, supra note 3, at 148-50 (discussing this concept in the edu-
cation arena).
96. Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 511 (1969).
97. Keyishian v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of N.Y., 385 U.S. 589, 603 (1967).
98. Tenney, supra note 9, at 1639 (discussing this idea with regard to topics but
not viewpoints).
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mation regarding their own sexualities. Also, students may be
interested in learning about the sexualities of individuals with
sexual orientations that differ from their own. Thus, schools
ought to present multiple perspectives on sexual orientation.
In summary, suppression of a broader perspective on sexual
education at public high schools is not reasonably related to any
legitimate pedagogical concern since schools would present, not
promote, sexual minority perspectives. Moreover, suppression of
sexual minority perspectives leads to unconstitutional viewpoint
discrimination and damages the education of both heterosexual
and sexual minority students. Furthermore, this Article in no
way proposes to silence campus speech against minority sexuali-
ties because students who oppose minority sexualities remain
free to speak out and participate in the discourse on human sexu-
ality. Therefore, this Article's proposals are constitutional under
the First Amendment, and public high schools that teach sexual
education should adopt proposals of this nature.
B. Parental Rights
1. The Law on Parental Rights
Just as the rights of public high schools and students require
consideration, the rights of parents also call for consideration.
This point is especially accurate in the case of high school stu-
dents because they generally are still under the legal guidance of
their parents. Traditionally, the U.S. Supreme Court has given
great weight to parental rights. In the 1920s, the Court first ob-
served that parents have a Fourteenth Amendment substantive
due process liberty right to decide how to raise their children. 99
Two decades later, the Court noted, "It is cardinal with us that
the custody, care and nurture of the child reside first in the par-
ents, whose primary function and freedom include preparation
for obligations the state can neither supply nor hinder." 100 More
recently, the Court explained that "the primary role of the par-
99. Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923) (law against teaching foreign
languages to students held to violate parents' substantive due process liberty right to
raise their children).
100. Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166 (1944) (statute designed to pro-
tect children from the harms of child labor upheld over objection of guardian who
wanted her minor ward to hand out religious literature).
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ents in the upbringing of their children is now established beyond
debate as an enduring American tradition." 10 1
Despite the great esteem in which the Supreme Court has
held the right of parents to raise their children, limits to this right
exist. In summarizing the limits of the Supreme Court's child-
rearing jurisprudence, the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals has
noted that for there to be a violation of parents' rights, the al-
leged state interference must require or prohibit some activity of
the children.102 According to the Supreme Court, examples of
requiring or prohibiting some activity would include requiring
that students of a certain age attend public schools rather than
private schools1 03 and prohibiting teaching students a foreign lan-
guage. 1°4 The inquiry of whether the activity is required or pro-
hibited is a threshold test for determining whether government
action is constitutional.10 5
Regardless of whether state action requires or prohibits
some activity, the government may still burden the rights of par-
ents in order to protect children under the doctrine of parens pa-
triae. The doctrine of parens patriae refers to "the state in its
capacity as provider of protection to those unable to care for
themselves. ' 10 6 This doctrine allows coercive intervention by the
government into the lives of children and the family,10 7 permit-
ting "the government to become the custodian of a child, and to
assume the child-rearing duties normally assumed by the child's
101. Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 232 (1972) (holding that compulsory
school attendance would violate Amish parents' right to religious upbringing of their
children).
102. Doe v. Irwin, 615 F.2d 1162, 1168-69 (6th Cir. 1980) (holding that publicly-
operated family planning center which distributed contraceptives to unemancipated
minors without parental notice did not violate constitutional rights of parents).
103. Pierce v. Soc'y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 535 (1925).
104. Meyer, 262 U.S. at 400.
105. Patrick Henigan, Note, Is Parental Authority Absolute? Public High Schools
Which Provide Gay and Lesbian Youth Services Do Not Violate the Constitutional
Childrearing Right of Parents, 62 BROOK. L. REV. 1261, 1277-78 (1996) (using the
language "coercive nature of the alleged state interference" when addressing the
issue of a threshold test).
106. BLACK'S LAW DiCTnONARY, supra note 68, at 1137. The term parens patriae
literally means "parents of the country." Claude Noriega, Note & Comment, Stick a
Fork in It: Is Juvenile Justice Done?, 16 N.Y.L. SCH. J. HUM. RTS. 669, 673 (2000).
This old doctrine stems from the English common law. Jack Ratliff, Parens Patriae:
An Overview, 74 TUL. L. REV. 1847, 1850 (2000).
107. Sacha M. Coupet, Comment, What to Do with the Sheep in Wolfs Clothing:
The Role of Rhetoric and Reality About Youth Offenders in the Constructive Disman-
tling of the Juvenile Justice System, 148 U. PA. L. REV. 1303, 1309 (2000).
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parents." 10 8 The authority for the doctrine comes from the
state's inherent power to protect its citizens from harm. 10 9
When the state acts under parens patriae, there must be suf-
ficient evidence that "parental decisions will jeopardize the
health or safety of the child." 110 For instance, the state can act
under parens patriae when it mandates that children attend
school, although not necessarily public school,11 ' and when the
state proscribes certain types of child labor.11 2 Once the govern-
ment lawfully acts under parens patriae, the government has the
same discretion in raising the child as the child's parents would
have had.113
In certain cases, the state may even use the doctrine of
parens patriae to remove a child from the child's parents. To re-
move a child from the parents, the state needs to make its case by
showing the existence of at least one of the following factors:
abandonment of the child," 4 extreme disinterest in the child,115
parental incapacity to care for the child,1 16 extreme or repeated
child abuse or neglect, 117 deterioration of the parent-child rela-
tionship,1 8 parental drug addiction, 1 9 parental incarceration or
criminal record, 20 or parental failure to provide education or
medical treatment.1 21 In the context of medical treatment, the
108. Noriega, supra note 106, at 673.
109. DONALD T. KRAMER, LEGAL RIGHTS OF CHILDREN 4 (1994).
110. Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 233-34 (1972).
111. Id. at 213.
112. Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166 (1944).
113. Noriega, supra note 106, at 673.
114. KRAMER, supra note 109, at 15. The term abandonment refers to "a parent's
intentional withholding from a child, without just cause or excuse, the parent's pres-
ence, care, love, protection, maintenance, and opportunity for display of parental
affection for the child." Id. An example of abandonment would be a parent's re-
peatedly and needlessly leaving a child with other adults for long periods of time.
Id. at 18.
115. Id. at 15. An example of parental disinterest would arise in the case of a
man who abandons the mother of his unborn child during the mother's pregnancy.
Id. at 19.
116. Id. at 24. An example of incapacity would be when a parent's mental or
physical problem becomes severe enough to prevent care for the child. Id.
117. Id. at 27. An example of abuse or neglect would be intentionally inflicted
physical or mental abuse. Id.
118. Id. at 34.
119. Id. at 37.
120. Id. at 41. Incarceration by itself is often not enough to terminate parental
rights. Id. at 41-42.
121. Id. at 40. For removal of the child from home based on parental failure to
provide for a child's education, the parental failure must be of a severe nature. Id.
For removal based on parental failure to provide medical treatment, the state must
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state can act under parens patriae if parents object on religious
grounds to protecting their children; the Supreme Court has
stated that while "[p]arents may be free to become martyrs them-
selves," parents are not free "to make martyrs of their children
before [the children] have reached the age of full and legal dis-
cretion when they can make that choice for themselves."' 1
22
2. The Law on Parental Rights Applied to Sexual Education
To demonstrate a violation of their child-rearing rights, par-
ents would need to show that the alleged state interference re-
quired or prohibited some activity of their children. 123 Under
normal circumstances, this Article's proposals would not lead to
requiring or prohibiting some activity of children at school. Pro-
posals such as offering sexual minority support groups for stu-
dents who want such groups and discussing sexual minority issues
in certain classes would not require or prohibit some activity.
Under normal circumstances, such as in the absence of risk of
suicide, students would not be forced to attend support groups.
Also, parents would be free to have their children excused from
activities of which the parents did not approve. For example, if
two parents did not wish to have their child participate in part of
a class that dealt with sexual education, the parents could with-
draw their child from that specific part of the class, much as par-
ents can now withdraw their children from traditional sexual
education classes. 124 The issue should be no different whether
make the case that the parent failed to exercise care which an ordinarily prudent and
loving parent concerned for the well-being of his or her child would exercise. Id. at
40-41. The state's burden becomes less when a medical emergency is at hand. Id. at
41.
122. Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 170 (1944).
123. Doe v. Irwin, 615 F.2d 1162, 1168 (6th Cir. 1980).
124. See, e.g., CAL. EDUC. CODE § 51939(a) (West Supp. 2004) (providing the
option for parents, upon written request, to opt their children out of sexual educa-
tion classes at school). At least thirty-three states have adopted sexual education
statutes similar to California's. Camille Waters, Note, A, B, C's and Condoms for
Free: A Legislative Solution to Parents' Rights and Condom Distribution in Public
Schools, 31 VAL. U. L. Rnv. 787, 824 n.244 (1997).
On a related note, the highest court in at least one state has held that the place-
ment of condom distribution machines in public high schools does not burden the
right of parents to raise their children. Curtis v. Sch. Comm. of Falmouth, 652
N.E.2d. 580 (Mass. 1995), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 1067 (1996). In Curtis, the Supreme
Judicial Court of Massachusetts stated that mere placement of condom distribution
machines in public high schools does not offend parents' rights if the program is not
required. Id. at 586. But see Alfonso v. Fernandez, 606 N.Y.S.2d 259 (1993) (paren-
tal opt-out provision required for voluntary condom distribution program in public
high school to comport with right of parents to raise their children).
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the discussion addresses minority sexualities or heterosexuality;
parental withdrawal would be permissible in either case. Thus,
because the school's actions normally would not lead to required
or prohibited activities, there would be no violation of the paren-
tal right to child-rearing.
In extreme circumstances, however, the state may have to
require student activity and would need to rely on the doctrine of
parens patriae in order to act constitutionally. When the state
acts under parens patriae, there must be sufficient evidence that
"parental decisions will jeopardize the health or safety of the
child.'1 25
For example, parents might refuse to allow their gay child,
who may be at risk for suicide, to attend a sexual minority sup-
port group. 126 The worse the assessment of the child's mental
health from the school psychologist is, the greater the need to
protect the youth's health and safety would be. If the student
had been withdrawn for long periods of time, verbally or physi-
cally attacked by classmates, and missing while having run away
from home, school officials would have a very good case for
showing that the parental decision of keeping the young gay stu-
dent away from the sexual minority counseling group would
jeopardize the health or safety of the youth. Accordingly, the
state would be able to mandate that the gay youth attend the
counseling group.
Furthermore, the case might be potentially serious enough
to warrant removing the child from his parents due to parental
failure to provide education or medical treatment. 127 For re-
moval of the child from the parents based on parental failure to
provide for a child's education, the parental failure to provide
The decision of the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts in Curtis might
suggest that, regardless of parental approval, broader sexual education would not
violate parental rights so long as the program is voluntary. A critical distinction
between the Massachusetts condom case and the case of broader sexual education is
that the latter would call for students to study material actively rather than passively
experience the presence of condom distribution machines. Accordingly, the poten-
tial harm to the parental right of raising children could be much greater where stu-
dents are actively studying material on sexual orientation.
125. Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 233-34 (1972).
126. The key difference between this hypothetical situation with an at-risk child
and a hypothetical situation in which parents refuse to allow their not-at-risk child
access to sexual education is the health of the child. The more drastic the situation
is, the better the state's case for acting under parens patriae would be.
127. KRAMER, supra note 109, at 40.
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education must be of a severe nature. 128 For removal based on
parental failure to provide medical treatment, the state must
make the case that the parents failed to exercise care which ordi-
narily prudent and loving parents concerned for the well-being of
their child would exercise.129
In the above hypothetical situation, the state would be able
to assume responsibility for the at-risk gay youth's upbringing.
Failing to allow a gay child to learn about his sexuality is severe
parental behavior because of the various potential health risks to
the child. As noted above, suicide is one such risk. In this type
of extreme situation, other concerns like how to raise a child be-
come irrelevant until the child is no longer at risk for suicide.
Also, such parental behavior demonstrates the failure to exercise
care which ordinarily prudent and loving parents concerned for
the well-being of their child would exercise since the parents
could be denying their child the opportunity to have counseling
for the challenges he faces.130
In summary, for the most part, broader sexual education in
public high schools would not require or prohibit activities of stu-
dents, so parents' rights normally would not suffer. Nevertheless,
in a case where a student's health was seriously at risk, the state
would have a legitimate reason to act under the doctrine of
parens patriae in order to compel action or remove the student
from the custody of his or her parents. Therefore, the proposals
that this Article makes are constitutional under the Fourteenth
Amendment, and public high schools that opt to teach sexual ed-
ucation should adopt proposals of this nature.
V. CONCLUSION
Public high schools that ignore the various sexualities of
their students should realize that such schools are contributing to
the plight of numerous sexual minority students who do not fit
comfortably into a heteronormative culture. To help sexual mi-
nority students, these schools need to take several measures, in-
cluding the following: providing sexual minority youth with
support groups, ensuring that class discussions include of a wide
variety of sexualities when appropriate, providing diversity train-
128. Id.
129. Id. at 40-41.
130. This understanding of the term medical treatment is broad enough to include
treatment for the mind, such as counseling that may grow out of information re-
ceived at school.
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ing for teachers that includes sexual orientation, and adopting
non-discrimination policies that address sexual orientation.
These proposals do not offend the First Amendment, which, in
cases of schools that offer sexual education, calls for discourse
among students regarding different sexual orientations, nor do
the proposals offend the Fourteenth Amendment, which, while
securing the substantive due process liberty right of parents to
raise their children, also provides for the needs of children.
Ultimately, sexual minority high school students like the fif-
teen-year-old gay youth from Jackson, Mississippi, who wrote to
the Indiana Youth Group with a desperate cry for help, should
not have to feel coerced into committing suicide because of their
sexualities. For years, public high schools have addressed the
sexuality of heterosexual students, and with a few key changes
the same public high schools can begin to address the sexualities
of sexual minority students as well. The time to embrace both
further diversity and also the well-being of all public high school
students has long since arrived.
